



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

# 3rd PROGRESS REPORT

on the  
Implementation of the Secretary's  
Directives for Law Enforcement Reform

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



*DISQUIETING STATE OF DISORDER:  
AN ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
LAW ENFORCEMENT*

No. 2002-1-0014

January 2003

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
Office of Inspector General

## *Progress Report*

*Secretary's Directives for  
Implementing  
Law Enforcement Reform in the  
Department of the Interior*

August 2003  
No. 2003-1-0062



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
Office of Inspector General



**PROGRESS REPORT**  
Secretary's Directives for Implementing Law Enforcement Reform



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# United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
Washington, D.C. 20240

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## Memorandum

To: Secretary Salazar

From: Earl E. Devaney  
Inspector General 

Subject: Assessment Report on Directives for Reforming Law Enforcement in the Department of the Interior

Attached please find the third report by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) detailing the progress the Department of the Interior (DOI) has made in implementing the 2002 Secretarial Directives for reform of DOI law enforcement programs.

In 2002 the OIG concluded a comprehensive assessment of law enforcement in DOI. We found significant problems throughout DOI's law enforcement programs and identified improvements needed in the leadership, organization, control, and accountability. As a result of this assessment, then-Secretary Norton issued 25 Secretarial Directives to implement needed reforms.

We have monitored the progress of the reforms with formal status reports, and a series of assessments. The results of this most recent assessment indicate that 10 of the 25 directives are still not fully implemented, more than six years after they were made. Implementation of these remaining directives is essential to furthering the progress that has been made in DOI's law enforcement programs, and, at last, making the disquieting state of disorder we found in 2002 a thing of the past.

If you have any questions about this report, please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 208-5745.

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# INTRODUCTION

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This report presents the results of our third follow-up review on the Department's progress in implementing the Secretary's July 2002 directives for law enforcement reforms. The progress regarding the implementation of the directives should not be viewed, or used, as a gauge on how effective the law enforcement program(s) are; it simply provides an overview of their completion of specific directives.

## Background

In March 2001, at the request of the Secretary, we conducted an assessment of the Department of the Interior's law enforcement activities, including the following programs:

- Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
- Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
- Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
- Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
- National Park Service (NPS)
- National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS)
- U.S. Park Police (USPP)

Our January 2002 assessment report, *Disquieting State of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of the Interior Law Enforcement*, concluded, in part, that the Department had to take significant steps to professionalize the bureau law enforcement programs, improve officer safety, and provide the Secretary and external law enforcement programs one central point of contact and office to coordinate department-wide emergency responses. The report contained 25 recommendations for the Department and the bureaus to improve the leadership, organization, control, and accountability of Department law enforcement, security, and emergency management programs.

In July 2002, in response to our report, the Law Enforcement Review Panel (Review Panel), created by the Secretary, issued a report titled *Law Enforcement at the Department of the Interior, Recommendations to the Secretary for Implementing Law Enforcement Reforms*. The Secretary approved the Review Panel's report and directed that the report's recommendations be implemented.

In 2003, we conducted a follow-up assessment to determine the progress that the Department, its Office of Law Enforcement, Security and Emergency Management<sup>1</sup> (OLESEM), and the bureaus had made implementing the Secretary's directives. We

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<sup>1</sup> OLESEM was originally named the Office of Law Enforcement and Security. Its name was changed in June 2006 to reflect its duties relating to emergency management.

concluded that the Department, OLESEM and the bureaus had made limited progress in the timely implementation of corrective actions. We also noted that serious efforts were required to fully implement all of the directives.

In 2006, we conducted a second follow-up review to assess the Department and bureaus' progress in implementing the Secretary's directives since our 2003 review. We concluded that Department and bureaus had continued to improve and that a number of the Secretary's directives had been successfully implemented. However, the Department and bureaus continued to struggle in implementing more than half of the directives nearly four years after they were issued.

Over the past several years, our office has been committed to assessing law enforcement and security programs throughout the Department. In that regard, in addition to the noted follow-up status reports on the implementation of the Secretary's directives, our office has conducted other critical law enforcement and security reviews. We have reported on the dismal conditions of Indian Country Jails, the ineffective leadership, management and communication with the Fish and Wildlife Service law enforcement program and the United States Park Police, serious security lapses and management of National Park Service Icon protection, and the need for improvement of the Bureau of Reclamation Dam Security Program.

## Objective and Methodology

The objective of this review was to evaluate the progress that Department law enforcement, security, and emergency management programs made in implementing the Secretary's directives since our last review, and to determine the effectiveness of OLESEM's actions and oversight of these Department programs.

To accomplish our objective, we interviewed law enforcement, security, and emergency management officials, from the Department and the bureaus, as well as other Departmental officials involved with these programs. We also reviewed numerous reports and documents.

Our review was limited to determining the level of compliance that the Department and bureaus have made in implementing these directives. While we also reviewed OLESEM's general oversight of Department law enforcement, security, and emergency management programs, we did not assess the overall effectiveness of the individual programs we reviewed.

Using the information obtained through interviews and document reviews, we rated the implementation status of each directive into one of three categories:

- Implemented – Actions taken have fulfilled the intent of the directive.
- Moderate Progress – Actions taken demonstrate continued movement towards full implementation of the directive.
- Inadequate Progress – Actions taken have substantially failed to adequately address implementation of the directive.

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# RESULTS IN BRIEF

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Our review found that a majority of the Secretary's law enforcement directives have been successfully implemented and have effectively raised the prominence and safety of the Department's law enforcement, security, and emergency management programs. OLESEM has developed a centralized Departmental office that has helped to fill the void of Departmental leadership, coordination, and accountability that was our main concern in the 2002 assessment. OLESEM's leadership role has undoubtedly assisted in elevating the professionalism realized by all bureau law enforcement programs since 2002. In addition, OLESEM has provided the intended, and much needed one-stop shop for both the Secretary and external law enforcement programs, to include the Department of Homeland Security.

As a result of achieving this central leadership role, OLESEM's responsibilities and duties have increased since the issuance of the Secretary's directives and often times other priorities have impacted their ability to focus on completing and implementing the remaining directives. OLESEM must continually deal with a plethora of Homeland Security Presidential Directives and Executive Orders that were not present or envisioned when the Secretary's directives were established. In addition, the Secretary directed an increased focus and responsibility for border security and drug initiatives, as well as directing OLESEM to assist and correct major deficiencies found with the management of the United States Park Police by providing staff, as well as considerable planning time.

While Department and bureau law enforcement and security programs have come a long way over the past seven years, there are still several directives that have yet to be fully implemented. Of those directives that remain to be implemented, three have made, what we consider to be, inadequate progress towards implementation.

One of the directives that OLESEM has failed to implement to date is the development and implementation of a Department-wide incident reporting system. The development of this major undertaking has taken the quintessential one step forward and two steps back. There have been continued deficiencies with contract and program management from its inception by NPS as well when taken over by OLESEM. Continued differences among OLESEM and the bureaus over project design and funding have also hampered progress.

The National Business Center (NBC) is responsible for security at the Main Interior Building. One of the Secretary's directives required NBC to augment its security staff with an appointment of a professional security manager. In our 2006 status report we noted that the Chief of Security had a limited security background and training. Since that report, NBC has not provided the Chief of Security with any training to obtain professional certification or made any other effort to improve his qualifications.

We also found that OLESEM's progress in developing and issuing department-wide policies and procedures to be inadequate. We were told that developing and issuing the required policies have been delayed for a variety of reasons, to include staff being redirected for higher priority assignments, a failure of several bureaus to provide the required detailed positions to OLESEM, as well as the difficulty of getting policy through the Solicitor's office and the Department's cumbersome review and surname process. We find none of these explanations to be sufficiently convincing to account for the sustained failure to provide timely and effective policy implementation.

Underscoring OLESEM's inability to develop policy and provide proper oversight is the argument of some bureau law enforcement managers that OLESEM has not appropriately allocated its staff according to needs and priorities. This perception has impacted the bureaus willingness to comply with providing directed detail positions or funding for positions to OLESEM.

The Internal Affairs Branch (IAB) within OLESEM operates within a cloud of ambiguity and has never fully filled its intended role as an overseer of bureau internal affairs units. Bureaus told us that their relationship with IAB is limited to merely submitting data into the IAB automated tracking system. Site inspections by IAB are infrequent, and have not resulted in providing significant guidance into investigative practice.

Overall, the bureaus have been successful with implementation of the directives; in fact, four bureaus have implemented all directives assigned to them. Line-item budgeting for law enforcement has improved, but not uniformly. The originally identified issue remains; funds designated for certain law enforcement programs can be diverted by managers and used for other projects. Two bureaus have yet to develop comprehensive and verifiable staffing models. Finally, the recent mandate to expand the number of NPS seasonal law enforcement officers directly conflicts with the existing directive to decrease dependence on their use.




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# DIRECTIVES AND FINDINGS

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The Department and the bureaus have implemented a large majority of the Secretary's directives for Law Enforcement reform. As the chart to the right indicates, when combining their responsibilities, the Department and the bureaus have implemented 82 percent of directive requirements. Summaries of the progress made by OLESEM and the individual bureaus' on each of the 25 directives are outlined below, along with recommendations for further improvement.



1

The Department should create a new career level Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security, reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget.

IMPLEMENTED

This directive has been fully implemented since July 2002. Mr. Larry Parkinson has served as the DAS-LESEM<sup>2</sup> since the position's inception.

2

DAS-LESEM, in consultation with the Board of Advisors, draft and codify the protocols and procedures for emergency deployment efforts.

IMPLEMENTED

The delegated authority to DAS-LESEM to allocate Department law enforcement resources during national emergencies, catastrophic/critical incidents, and other significant situations are now codified in part 212, chapter 17, of the Departmental Manual, which became effective June 14, 2006. Emergency management protocols and procedures are also codified in part 900 of the Departmental Manual, which became effective January 4, 2006.

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<sup>2</sup> This position was originally created as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security (DAS-LES). The position has since changed to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law, Enforcement, Security, and Emergency Management (DAS-LESEM) and will be referred to as the DAS-LESEM throughout this report.

## 3

OLESEM should be staffed with dedicated and experienced law enforcement personnel. The Review Panel recommends the DAS-LESEM develop a staffing model that meets the needs of the office. Detailed personnel from the bureaus should play an integral element of the office's staffing model.

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**

As OLESEM's responsibilities have increased, so has the need for qualified personnel. Since our 2006 assessment, OLESEM has increased its staff size and now has 58 positions, 13 of which are currently vacant. OLESEM relies heavily on the bureaus and other agencies for staffing. In fact, OLESEM only funds 41 of its 58 positions, the remaining positions detailed to OLESEM from the bureaus or are positions funded by other federal agencies (See Appendices 2 and 3 for organizational charts).

Despite having these additional positions, we share the bureaus' concern whether OLESEM staff is being used in the most effective manner for providing adequate policy, guidance, and oversight. We found less than half of the OLESEM staff is dedicated to policy development, oversight, and compliance. Twenty of the 58 OLESEM positions are dedicated to emergency management. Of the 38 remaining law enforcement and security positions, 6 are vacant and 5 are unfilled bureau detailee positions. It should also be noted that over the past year, three OLESEM officials were temporarily assigned to the U.S. Park Police for varying lengths of time, the longest for 11 months. Many of the law enforcement and security positions reflect the additional responsibilities assumed by OLESEM: Border and Drug Enforcement coordination and Incident Management Analysis and Reporting System (IMARS) project management.

According to OLESEM officials, bureau detailees continue to be an integral part of their organizational structure, adding a bureau perspective to policy development and providing an avenue of information sharing to and from the bureaus. Like OLESEM, some of the bureaus find value in the detailee program, stating that it helps keep them informed on issues driving Department decisions. On the other hand, other bureaus, some of which are facing staffing shortages, believed that OLESEM is adequately staffed and should develop a plan to reduce its reliance on detailee positions. Some bureaus argued that OLESEM has been in existence long enough to establish a plan for hiring permanent employees and move forward with its own strategic staffing objectives.

While we did not evaluate the detailee program, concerns raised during this assessment regarding this program warrant further consideration by OLESEM and Department leadership.

## Recommendation #1

OLESEM should review and realign its staff to best address current priorities, with specific attention given to achieving policy and oversight responsibilities. In addition, senior Department leadership should determine whether OLESEM staff should be supplemented with bureau detailees. Bureaus should be held accountable for complying with the Department's decision.

4

DAS-LESEM should review and revise the policies and procedures which guide the bureaus' interactions with OLESEM. This should be done in consultation with the Board of Advisors.

INADEQUATE  
PROGRESS

OLESEM has failed to fulfill its duty of issuing policy for Department and bureau law enforcement and security operations. Policies and procedures are the primary means by which the Department communicates its standards and expectations for bureau law enforcement and security programs. Failing to establish these standards erodes the Department's ability to measure and hold law enforcement and security programs accountable for their actions.

Despite the DAS-LESEM's description of OLESEM as a policy-driven office, has not had one person continually dedicated to the creation of policy. Instead, OLESEM has assigned policy development to various individuals throughout the office, resulting in inconsistent work products. While these authors may have good operational experience, we were told that their experience has not enabled them to develop broad-based policies for Departmental programs. The DAS-LESEM acknowledged that this has resulted in poorly written policy being submitted to the Office of the Solicitor (SOL) for review.

While OLESEM bears the burden of failing to issue policy to law enforcement and security programs, other Departmental offices contribute to this failure. The Department's policy review and surname processes continue to be arduous and excessively lengthy, and routinely exceed recommended review, clearance, and publication timelines set forth in the Departmental Manual.<sup>3</sup> We were told that staffing shortages and competing priorities in the SOL and Office of Planning and Performance Management continue to create log jams in the policy development process. We were also told that the Department has attempted to fund a position with SOL dedicated to law enforcement and security issues, but that the Office of Management and Budget rejected the request each time it was presented.

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<sup>3</sup> 011 DM 4

OLESEM has only issued two final and two interim security and law enforcement policies. An additional four policies are in the surnaming process and are nearing completion. This pace is woefully inadequate, considering that at a minimum 25 additional policies remain to be revised and issued. Despite OLESEM's failure to issue policy, the bureaus have continued to revise their law enforcement and security policies based on OLESEM interim and draft policies.

Currently, the DAS-LESEM does not have the authority to issue interim policy under his signature; interim policies must be signed by the Assistant Secretary - Policy, Management, and Budget, and must go through a surnaming process similar to that for issuing final policy. Because this process is so lengthy, OLESEM informed us that they are exploring avenues to receive authority for the DAS-LESEM to issue interim policy.

### Recommendation #2

OLESEM and the Department should work together to expedite and prioritize the review and surname process for law enforcement, security, and emergency management policies to conform to Departmental Manual guidelines.

### Recommendation #3

The DAS-LESEM should be provided with the authority to issue critical interim policy and guidance while awaiting final policy publication in the Department Manual.

5

The coordination and review responsibility for law enforcement and security budgets should be formalized as a shared function between DAS-LESEM and the DAS for Budget and Finance.

IMPLEMENTED

OLESEM has implemented the coordination and review responsibility as this directive intended. OLESEM provides budget guidance and meets with the individual bureaus annually to review their law enforcement, security, and emergency management budgets. According to most of the bureaus, OLESEM has been supportive and operates as an extra avenue for providing additional funding sources.

While we were told that the guidance provided by OLESEM has been helpful, some bureau officials also told us that the timing of the budget reviews should be improved.



Specifically, these bureaus explained that their individual budgets are typically prepared and already finalized before they meet with OLESEM.

#### Recommendation #4

The DAS-LESEM should take action to coordinate budget reviews at the appropriate time to have maximum effectiveness.

6

Each bureau is to establish a senior-level Director for Law Enforcement (and Security). When appropriate, the term "security" should be added to the title.

IMPLEMENTED

All of the law enforcement programs established senior-level positions for law enforcement and security directors. With the exception of NWRS and USPP, these positions are at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level. NWRS' Chief, Office of Refuge Law Enforcement, is a GS-15 position, and USPP's Chief of Police position is a GS-15 equivalent position. Previously, it was widely believed that the Chief of Police for the USPP was a SES equivalent position, which is not the case. The DAS-LESEM is aware of the issue and has brought it to the attention of the Secretary and NPS Director for future consideration.

#### Recommendation #5

The Department and NPS should elevate the USPP Chief of Police to an SES equivalent position.

7

Restructure the reporting system for special agents to create line law enforcement authority.

IMPLEMENTED

All applicable law enforcement programs have created reporting systems establishing line authority for special agents. While USPP does not have special agents, it does have line authority for all officers.

8

For all remaining law enforcement officers and personnel, each bureau should prepare a plan to enhance the accountability of field law enforcement operations. All non-law enforcement managers of law enforcement personnel should successfully complete a background investigation to ensure management integrity. All non-law enforcement managers of law enforcement personnel shall complete “Law Enforcement Training for Supervisors.”

IMPLEMENTED

All applicable law enforcement programs (NPS, NWRS, BLM, and BOR) address training, background investigations, and internal affairs accountability for managers who oversee law enforcement officers or units. Only NWRS has a written policy implementing this directive; the other bureaus incorporate their programs as a matter of practice.

9

Develop line-item budgeting for law enforcement activities. The Department is currently implementing Activity Based Costing.

**IMPLEMENTED**  
(BIA, BOR, FWS,  
NWRS & USPP)

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**  
(BLM AND NPS)

The original intent of this directive was to track law enforcement expenditures to ensure that these funds were actually applied toward law enforcement activities. Overall, we found that those bureaus who have fully implemented line-item budgeting have been able to track their law enforcement expenditures. While BLM and NPS have line-item budgets for their special agent programs, funding is distributed to the field for their ranger programs, and the use of those funds becomes uncertain.

10

DAS-LESEM should control designated Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and other special law enforcement funds to exercise formal review and strong oversight over the expenditure of those funds.

IMPLEMENTED

Both the Secretary's directives and the Departmental Manual<sup>4</sup> require OLESEM to control the bureau's expenditure of ONDCP funds. However, as a practical matter, OLESEM has little involvement with coordinating the ONDCP funds for the bureaus. OLESEM officials told us they are currently working with ONDCP to change this process.

When the directives were first instituted, ONDCP funds were distributed to agencies in lump-sum payments, and there was little or no control within DOI for these funds. Since the original directive was established, ONDCP has established a process that channels funding through the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program to reimburse approved expenditures. This process provides a level of control and oversight that meets the intent of the original directive.

11

Bureaus should complete an analysis of staffing models and methodologies.

**IMPLEMENTED**  
(BIA, BOR, FWS,  
NWRS & USPP)

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**  
(BLM AND NPS)

With the exception of BLM and NPS, the bureaus have staffing models that adequately address their law enforcement staffing needs. BLM recognizes the need to create a staffing model and is in the contract process with a vendor to provide a validated staffing model.

NPS has a Visitor Management-Resource Protection Assessment Program (VRAP), which has been used in conjunction with Law Enforcement Needs Assessments for each park to determine park staffing requirements. Similar to concerns expressed in our 2006 Progress Report, we caution NPS that the VRAP model has been heavily criticized and has not been validated. OLESEM recommended, and we agree, that NPS should properly vet and validate the VRAP model.

### Recommendation #6

BLM and NPS should develop contemporary, comprehensive, and verifiable staffing models within this fiscal year. OLESEM should provide a heightened level of oversight to ensure that this is completed.

<sup>4</sup> 112 DM 17.2(F).

12

Each bureau will assess the extent to which correct staffing shortages impact officer safety. The bureaus and DAS-LESEM should coordinate efforts to address the identified shortages immediately.

IMPLEMENTED

The bureaus continue to improve in assessing the impact of staffing shortages on officer safety. The bureaus have used various means to improve officer safety, including:

- hiring additional Park Rangers to assist at border parks;
- creating tandem patrol teams for public lands along the southwest border;
- creating “surge teams” for high crime areas;
- providing better equipment; and
- hiring civilian staff for critical officer safety support positions such as Force Armorer and Safety Officer.

However, officer safety remains a concern and must remain a constant priority within each bureau.

13

Bureaus will reduce dependence on collateral duty and seasonal law enforcement officers.

IMPLEMENTED  
(NWRS)MODERATE  
PROGRESS  
(NPS)

We are encouraged by NWRS’ progress in reducing the number of collateral-duty officers. The agency reduced the number of these officers from 208 in 2006 to 151 in 2008.

Unfortunately, it should be noted that according to an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of NWRS, this reduction in collateral-duty officers has not been balanced by the hiring of full-time equivalent officers. As a result, the report states that “[a]t many refuges, law enforcement coverage is insufficient to ensure the protection of resources and the safety of visitors and refuge staff.”<sup>5</sup>

As part of the Centennial Initiative, NPS has been tasked by the Secretary to hire an additional 1,000 seasonal law enforcement officers, directly conflicting with the 2002 directive. We are concerned that full-time law enforcement positions may lapse in order to achieve the mandated increase in seasonal officers. According to NPS, the mandated

<sup>5</sup> *An Independent Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Wildlife Refuge System, Management Systems International, June 2008.*



increase in seasonal officers was not fully funded and parks are forced to make up the difference, some of which, we were told, may come from lapsed full-time law enforcement positions. The preliminary numbers from 2008 reflect a decrease in full-time rangers and an increase in seasonal rangers, but NPS stated that they will not have the final numbers until the end of the calendar year.

### Recommendation #7

NPS should not divert funds from full-time law enforcement positions to hire seasonal rangers.

14

The Secretary has placed responsibility for security policy compliance and oversight with OLESEM.

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**

Our prior Progress Reports noted that OLESEM had hired an Assistant Director-Security to provide guidance and oversight of Department and bureau security operations. OLESEM subsequently hired a second person to assist the Assistant Director with personnel security issues surrounding the Department-wide implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 12, which deals with the common identification standard for federal employees and contractors. However, this person was detailed to the U.S. Park Police in March 2008, to assist with management issues at that agency, effectively leaving the Assistant Director as the sole person responsible for OLESEM security policy and oversight duties.

Since our last review, OLESEM has issued some security guidance to the Bureaus, has conducted on-site security surveys of National Monuments and Icons, and has conducted security compliance reviews at National Critical Infrastructure dams. Yet, as we reported in 2006, it still has not conducted comprehensive reviews of bureau security programs.

As mentioned before, added responsibilities and shifting priorities, such as OLESEM's required response to various Homeland Security initiatives, along with delays in Departmental review of proposed policies have continued to impede OLESEM's ability to effectively oversee bureau security programs and implement Department-wide security policies. We were told that external upper-level Homeland Security matters and Homeland Security Presidential Directives comprise half of the DAS-LESEM's workload. While we recognize the importance of this role, this level of external commitment has adversely impacted OLESEM's ability to oversee Department security and other core programs.

15

The review panel recommends that the National Business Center (NBC) augment its security staff with the appointment of a professional security manager to oversee this effort.

**INADEQUATE  
PROGRESS**

In 2003, NBC hired a Chief of Security to manage security operations for the Main and South Interior Buildings. During our 2006 Progress Report, we noted that the Chief of Security had only a limited security background, and his formal training in physical security measures was limited to the 10-day physical security training course at FLETC. We downgraded the progress of this directive because the Chief of Security has had no additional formal physical security training, since our 2006 report. It should be noted that we were told the Chief of Security has sought out training, but NBC has denied his training requests for budgetary purposes. While there are no Department training requirements for security managers, we believe continued training for the Chief of Security is necessary to remain proficient on current security trends and industry standards.

#### Recommendation #8

OLESEM should develop and implement initial and annual training standards for Department and bureau security managers and personnel. In the absence of Department-wide standards, NBC should ensure that its Chief of Security receives the security training required to achieve professional certification.

16

Each bureau will develop a senior-level, full-time security manager.

**IMPLEMENTED**  
(BIA, BLM, BOR, FWS,  
NPS & NWRS)

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**  
(USPP)

All of the bureaus have established and hired full-time security managers. However, USPP appointed a Deputy Chief as the Security Manager. The individual has been through only a basic two week critical infrastructure protection course at FLETC, and has no background in physical security.

In our 2006 report, we criticized NWRS and NPS for having security managers with limited to no training or experience in physical security. Since then, NWRS hired a new security specialist who has an extensive background in physical security and NPS's security manager has been through extensive physical security training.

17

The responsibility for emergency preparedness should remain with the Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety for the interim.  
(Superseded)

IMPLEMENTED

In 2002, OLESEM assumed the Department's emergency management responsibilities. Since that time, many events, such as avian flu and Hurricane Katrina, have fundamentally transformed Department's emergency management functions, causing it to grow in importance. As such, the program has expanded from a staff of three in 2006 to its current staff of 20. More recently, in September 2008, DAS-LESEM divided responsibilities concerning law enforcement and emergency management. The separation of these two entities provides better efficiency regarding the Department's approach to disaster training, response, and mitigation. We endorse this separation, which allows for the streamlined distribution of critical information among multi-disciplinary participants and centralizes the Department's emergency management efforts.

18

All bureaus should act promptly to ensure internal affairs coverage. The OLESEM should establish an internal affairs unit to perform an oversight role and to investigate bureau cases if the bureaus capacity is deemed inadequate.

**MODERATE  
PROGRESS**  
(OLESEM)

**IMPLEMENTED**  
(BUREAUS)

All bureaus have effective internal affairs coverage; however, the role of the OLESEM Internal Affairs Branch (IAB) has failed to materialize as originally envisioned by the Law Enforcement Review Panel. In our 2006 assessment, the DAS-LESEM told us that the IAB was "not where they need to be," noting that his goal was to develop a proactive unit that is capable of providing oversight, guidance, and support for bureau internal affairs programs. Now, two years later, we find that little has changed in IAB.

IAB is solely staffed by a branch chief who has also been the acting Assistant Director, Professional Responsibility and Compliance, for the past ten months, dividing time between both roles. The IAB branch chief is responsible for monitoring the automated case management system that tracks the status of bureau internal affairs cases. The IAB branch chief is also responsible for periodically reviewing bureau internal affairs programs and for coordinating the Department's Serious Incident Review Group (SIRG).

Some of the bureaus stated that they do not recognize the IAB as a valuable investigative resource and questioned its role. IAB was criticized by the bureaus for its lack of oversight, coordination, and support. We were told that bureau internal affairs units have infrequent contact with the IAB branch chief. While IAB has reviewed two bureau internal affairs offices, we were told that the bureaus did not receive a report on the results of the IAB review. In addition, IAB's attempts to organize a Department-wide training program have not gotten off the ground.

Over time, and in increasing frequency, bureaus have sought and received guidance from OIG staff regarding internal affairs cases and procedures instead of IAB. This open line of communication has become the preferred process for the bureaus to receive guidance and investigative assistance.

### Recommendation #9

OLESEM should clarify the role of its Internal Affairs Branch and take a more proactive role in providing guidance and oversight to bureau internal affairs programs.

19

OLESEM is to revise the Department Manual provisions addressing internal law enforcement incident reporting and resulting investigations.

IMPLEMENTED

Since our 2006 review, OLESEM has disseminated interim policy and guidance addressing internal law enforcement incident reporting and subsequent internal review. Furthermore, we learned that each bureau has policy and formalized procedures to report significant law enforcement related incidents. OLESEM and the bureaus have continued the practice of reviewing law enforcement related incidents through the SIRG and bureau Boards of Review.

20

DAS-LESEM should work with the Office of Human Resources on the development of recruitment strategies to increase the diversity of the law enforcement workforce.

IMPLEMENTED



OLESEM continues to assist the bureaus in promoting diversity among the DOI law enforcement programs. Since our 2006 review, OLESEM has developed a law enforcement website to attract a larger group of candidates. The majority of bureaus have increased efforts to recruit and retain a diverse law enforcement workforce. Although the majority of bureaus are taking steps to recruit a diverse workforce, their efforts aren't always successful because the diversity pool of candidates can be very shallow, especially in remote areas.

Our 2006 report recognized the progress of law enforcement's gender diversity statistics. While current DOI data reflects a reversal of the 2005 increase in the female workforce, improvements in ethnic diversity reflects significant progress, as almost all diversity groups show an increase across the board.

21

OLESEM should research the background investigation process and determine what can be done to decrease the time it takes to hire applicants.

IMPLEMENTED

The bureaus stated that noticeable improvements have occurred in reducing the time needed to hire law enforcement candidates. Some bureaus have hired additional adjudicators to streamline the hiring process. To further accelerate the process in specific circumstances, OLESEM has authority to approve hiring waivers for new employees. These waivers are conditional upon the successful adjudication of a full background investigation. Many of the bureaus agreed that their ability to use waivers has been beneficial.

Although the use of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) automated background investigation program has been helpful, the largest obstacle facing some of the bureaus continues to be the length of time OPM takes to complete background investigations.

22

DAS-LESEM should develop specific training recommendations with reporting and evaluation mechanisms that focus on consistent training for full-time, collateral and seasonal officers.

IMPLEMENTED

The Land Management Police Training Program (LMPTP) at FLETC is the integrated basic

training program for the majority of DOI uniformed law enforcement officers. New BIA uniformed officers attend their own basic training academy at FLETC. Starting in 2009, USPP will migrate to the Uniformed Police Training Program at FLETC, which is better suited to address their operational needs. All special agents attend the FLETC Criminal Investigator Training Program.

NPS seasonal law enforcement officers do not attend LMPTP. NPS continues to rely on nine colleges across the country to provide training for seasonal law enforcement officers. Historically, these training academies have been an object of concern. We were told that NPS staff has visited each academy and reviewed training standards within the past 3 years. Furthermore, the current syllabus used for the seasonal training program is dated 2002 and is scheduled to be revised in February 2009 to mirror the LMPTP program. We were encouraged to learn that OLESEM's training coordinator has also visited two seasonal training academies and is reviewing their curricula.

Note: Following our assessment of the U.S. Park Police, the Secretary directed that all bureaus report quarterly to OLESEM on the status of officers' in-service training and other requirements.

23

OLESEM should develop a consistent Department-wide centralized records system.

INADEQUATE  
PROGRESS

The development of IMARS has faced repeated roadblocks preventing its implementation. In our 2006 review, we noted that there were delays in the IMARS contract solicitation process. Since then, repeated delays and excessive cost have caused some bureaus to lose confidence in the IMARS program and question whether it will ever be operational. OLESEM now estimates IMARS will be completed in late 2009 or early 2010.

Due to concerns raised, IMARS was the subject of a separate OIG review. The review found that the IMARS project lacks clear authority and leadership. Although OLESEM acquired responsibility for the project from NPS in 2007, and hired staff to oversee IMARS development, OLESEM still lacks the authority to make final decisions on the project. In addition, the review found that the project lacks the resources required to achieve successful implementation.

#### Recommendation #10

OLESEM should be given sole responsibility and authority for the IMARS project and devote adequate resources to meet the needs of the project.

24

DAS-LESEM should work with the DAS for Performance Management to develop performance goals and outcome measures.

IMPLEMENTED

As noted in previous reports, strategic plans and outcome measures for law enforcement and security programs have been incorporated into the Department's strategic plan. OLESEM has also created performance goals and measures for Department-wide law enforcement and security programs to support the Department's strategic plan.

25

DAS-LESEM should work with the Office of the Solicitor to coordinate the revision of the interagency cross designation agreements.

IMPLEMENTED

The Interagency Cross Designation Agreement, first created on June 17, 2004, was revised on July 17, 2007, to include OLESEM as a party to the Agreement. OLESEM collaborated with SOL to implement this change.

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# RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. OLESEM should review and realign its staff to best address current priorities, with specific attention given to achieving policy and oversight responsibilities. In addition, senior Department leadership should determine whether OLESEM staff should be supplemented with bureau detailees. Bureaus should be held accountable for complying with the Department's decision.
2. OLESEM and the Department should work together to expedite and prioritize the review and surname processes for law enforcement, security, and emergency management policies to conform to Departmental Manual guidelines.
3. The DAS-LESEM should be provided with the authority to issue critical interim policy and guidance while awaiting final policy publication in the Departmental Manual.
4. The DAS-LESEM should take action to coordinate budget reviews at the appropriate time to have maximum effectiveness.
5. The Department and NPS should elevate the USPP Chief of Police to an SES equivalent position.
6. BLM and NPS should develop contemporary, comprehensive, and verifiable staffing models within this fiscal year. OLESEM should provide a heightened level of oversight to ensure that this is completed.
7. NPS should not divert funds from full-time law enforcement positions to hire seasonal rangers.
8. OLESEM should develop and implement initial and annual training standards for Department and bureau security managers and personnel. In the absence of Department-wide standards, NBC should ensure that its Chief of Security receives the security training required to achieve professional certification.
9. OLESEM should clarify the role of its Internal Affairs Branch and take a more proactive role in providing guidance and oversight to bureau internal affairs programs.
10. OLESEM should be given sole responsibility and authority for the IMARS project and devote adequate resources to meet the needs of the project.



# APPENDIX 1

## STATUS OF THE SECRETARY'S DIRECTIVES

DIRECTIVE	OLESEM	BIA	BLM	BOR	FWS	NPS	NWRS	USPP
1 - Create DAS-LES	Implemented							
2 - Emergency Protocols	Implemented							
3 - OLES Staffing	Moderate Progress							
4 - OLES Policy w/ Bureaus	Inadequate Progress							
5 - Budget Coordinator	Implemented							
6 - Senior LE Director		Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented
7 - Line Authority 1811		Implemented	Implemented		Implemented	Implemented		
8 - Non-LE Mgr			Implemented	Implemented		Implemented	Implemented	
9 - Line-Item Budgets		Implemented	Moderate Progress	Implemented	Implemented	Moderate Progress	Implemented	Implemented
10 - ONDCP Funding	Implemented							
11 - Staffing Model		Implemented	Moderate Progress	Implemented	Implemented	Moderate Progress	Implemented	Implemented
12 - Officer Safety		Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented
13 - Seasonal & Collateral						Moderate Progress	Implemented	
14 - Oversight of Security	Moderate Progress							
15 - NBC – MIB Security	Inadequate Progress							
16 - Bureau Security		Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Moderate Progress
17 - Emergency	Implemented							
18 - Internal Affairs	Moderate Progress	Implemented	Implemented		Implemented	Implemented	Implemented	Implemented
19 - LE Incident Reporting	Implemented							
20 - Recruitment - Diversity	Implemented							
21 - Research Backgrounds	Implemented							
22 - Training	Implemented							
23 - Centralized Records	Inadequate Progress							
24 - Performance Goals	Implemented							
25 - Cross Delegation	Implemented							


Inadequate Progress

Moderate Progress

Implemented


# APPENDIX 2

## OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION CHART



# APPENDIX 3

## OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION CHART



## **How to Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse and Mismanagement**

Fraud, waste, and abuse in government are the concern of everyone, Office of Inspector General staff, departmental employees, and the general public. We actively solicit allegations of any inefficient and wasteful practices, fraud, and abuse related to departmental or Insular Area programs and operations. You can report allegations to us by:

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Office of Inspector General  
Mail Stop 4428-MIB  
1849 C Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20240

**Phone:** 24-Hour Toll Free 800-424-5081  
Washington Metro Area 703-487-5435  
Fax 703-487-5402

**Internet:** [http://www.doioig.gov/form/hotlinecmp\\_form.php](http://www.doioig.gov/form/hotlinecmp_form.php)



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