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Source: Adobe Stock

Abbreviations List

AIE	Office of Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations	
AS-IA	Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs	
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs	
BIE	Bureau of Indian Education	
BLM	Bureau of Land Management	
BOEM	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management	
BOR	Bureau of Reclamation	
BSEE	Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement	
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations	
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency	
DAS-M	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management [AS-IA]	
DOI	U.S. Department of the Interior	
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice	
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency	
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation	
FTR	Federal Travel Regulations	
FWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service	
FY	Fiscal year	
IGP	Institute of the Great Plains	
IIJA	Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act	
KEV	Known Exploited Vulnerabilities	

NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPS	National Park Service
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OI	Office of Investigations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLE	Office of Law Enforcement
OLES	Office of Law Enforcement and Security
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSMRE	Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
	and Enforcement
OWF	Office of Wildland Fire
OWPO	Orphaned Wells Program Office
PFM	Office of Financial Management
PMB	Office of Policy, Management and Budget
PPP	Paycheck Protection Program
SBA	U.S. Small Business Administration
SOL	Office of the Solicitor
U.S.C.	United States Code
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
WSFR	Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Program



Source: Adobe Stock

Our Mission, Vision, and Values

he Inspector General Act of 1978 authorized and established the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) Office of Inspector General as an independent and objective unit to help promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse. We conduct fair, objective and neutral audits, inspections, evaluations, investigations, and reviews. We report our findings to DOI officials and Congress. In conducting our work, we act with professionalism and integrity.

When we find areas for improvement, we make recommendations for corrective actions. When we identify potential criminal violations, we refer cases to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and

actively support prosecutions and civil actions. We also review concerns regarding the integrity and performance of contractors and financial assistance recipients, and, when warranted, recommend that DOI take administrative action, including suspension and debarment.

Our Mission

Promote economy and efficiency, and prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in the programs and operations of DOI.

Our Vision

Drive improvements and promote accountability at DOI through fair, neutral, and objective oversight.

Our Values INTEGRITY



We demonstrate our integrity by acting with honesty and professionalism.

OBJECTIVITY



We remain independent, neutral, and unbiased, gather all relevant facts, and base our findings on supportable evidence.

IMPACT



We enable decision makers to take actions that increase efficiency, save taxpayer dollars, and hold bad actors accountable.

EXCELLENCE



We are an effective, innovative, and dedicated organization that consistently produces high-quality work.



Source: Adobe Stock

Focus Areas of Oversight

Ol's responsibilities have a significant public impact, and we accordingly strive to conduct oversight that will have a positive effect on DOI's programs and operations. To arrive at focus areas for our oversight, we considered DOI's major management challenges as we defined them for fiscal year (FY) 2024—managing spending, delivering core services, and ensuring health and safety—along with stakeholder priorities, prior work, and emerging threats or vulnerabilities. The work we completed this reporting period addressed several of these focus areas.



CONTRACT AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OVERSIGHT



CYBERSECURITY



DATA AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY



ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT



HEALTH AND SAFETY



PAYMENT INTEGRITY



TRIBAL NATIONS AND INSULAR COMMUNITIES



WORKPLACE CULTURE AND HUMAN CAPITAL

A Message From the Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General

am pleased to submit this semiannual report summarizing the oversight work of DOI Office of Inspector General (OIG) between April 1 and September 30, 2025.

OIG promotes efficiency and effectiveness and prevents and detects fraud, waste, and abuse in DOI's programs and operations. As described throughout this report, our oversight during this reporting period addressed some of DOI's most persistent challenges in its

highest risk programs and operations. We issued reports addressing health and safety in Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools, DOI's use of funding provided by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and other topics of significance to the agency.

For example, we inspected BIE's Riverside Indian School and found that BIE did not always ensure safety and health deficiencies were addressed or resolved in a timely manner—an inoperative fire detection alarm system that had been identified in January 2024 had not been addressed over a year later, and no mitigating measures had been put into place as required. This report was one of an ongoing series of reviews our office is conducting to determine if deficiencies identified during BIE's safety and health inspections were adequately resolved. We have published the results of three of these reviews to date, and since 2023, we have made 29 related recommendations to BIE, 26 of which have not been implemented.

DOI received over \$28 billion in new funding from the IIJA; during this reporting period we continued our work to help ensure that these funds are used effectively and efficiently. For example, the IIJA provided \$878 million to DOI to plan and implement wildland fire fuels management



in areas and communities at the highest risk of wildfire. We reviewed DOI's management of the IIJA fuels management funds and concluded that the bureaus did not always comply with the IIJA's project prioritization requirements and that DOI was not efficiently managing the funds.

Our work also addressed other areas where DOI has faced significant challenges. For example:

- We identified opportunities for DOI to improve its cybersecurity by evaluating DOI's efforts to remediate known software vulnerabilities as well as its enterprisewide cyber threat hunting capability;
- We recommended that DOI provide closer oversight of IT purchases;
- We reviewed the Office of Insular Affairs' oversight of the Insular Areas' single audit submissions and recommended improvements to improve timeliness;
- We audited BLM's management and processing of rights of way applications for solar and wind energy development on public lands;
- We inspected Federal grants to States to remediate orphaned wells and abandoned mine lands funded by the IIJA;
- We partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to investigate a conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering, which resulted in the ringleader being sentenced to 293 months in Federal prison; and

 We found that a former research archeologist embezzled funds received through Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) cooperative agreements and improperly made unauthorized personal purchases, totaling more than \$30,000.

This has been a particularly productive reporting period. Our Office of Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations (AIE) issued 20 reports containing 91 recommendations to DOI to address weaknesses found during our oversight. Moreover, we received information from DOI that enabled us to close 141 recommendations this reporting period, including one of our priority recommendations—these are examples of how ongoing engagement between DOI and OIG can lead to meaningful improvement.

Our Office of Investigations (OI) received 660 complaints, opened 45 new investigations, and closed 31 investigations during the reporting period. We referred 15 matters for prosecution and our investigative findings led to 3 criminal convictions and 12 personnel actions—including 2 removals, 1 retirement, and 1 suspension. Our investigative


referrals also led to 13 debarments during the reporting period, protecting taxpayer dollars against fraud, waste, abuse, and poor performance.

This work results from the ongoing commitment of the dedicated public servants throughout OIG to conduct and deliver fair, neutral, and objective oversight. Their efforts to improve DOI and promote accountability provide value for the American public in many different ways, including by advancing the effective and efficient use of taxpayer resources. I look forward to continuing to identify ways that DOI can improve its programs and practices.


C. Bay

Caryl N. Brzymialkiewicz, Ph.D. Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of the Inspector General

Source: Adobe Stock



Statistical Highlights | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025



Featured Reports

Improvements Needed in the U.S. Department of the Interior's Management and Oversight of Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funding for Fuels Management (2023-CR-009)

The IIJA provides \$878 million over five years to DOI to plan and implement wildland fire fuels management in areas and communities at the highest risk of catastrophic wildfire. DOI's Office of Wildland Fire (OWF) oversees the fuels management program for DOI's four bureaus with wildland firefighting duties: the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS). The objective of our audit was to determine whether

OWF and these bureaus are efficiently managing IIJA fuels management funds and expending them in accordance with the Act.

OWF is responsible for overseeing the planning, implementation, and monitoring of the fuels management program and its projects. Of the 535 million acres of land DOI manages, it has identified approximately 7.1 million acres as having a "very high" or "high" likelihood of exposure to wildfires. The influx of approximately \$848 million of IIJA funding for fuels management projects is in addition to annual appropriations and other supplemental funding. In particular, IIJA § 40803 prioritizes reducing wildfire risk on federally managed land identified as having "very high" wildfire hazard potential and treating 10 million acres in the wildland urban interface or areas where sources of public drinking water are at high risk of wildfire.

Internal control weaknesses in the oversight and management of IIJA fuels management funds may significantly affect DOI's ability to ensure bureaus are using the funds in accordance with the IIJA and to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

We found that OWF did not efficiently manage IIJA fuels management funds and that the bureaus did not always expend IIJA funds in accordance with the Act. Specifically, OWF and the bureaus did not comply with the IIJA project prioritization requirements for fuels management projects and funding (referred to as "treatments" in the Act). Although OWF required bureaus to identify projects consistent with program and IIJA objectives, we found OWF continued to distribute the IIJA fuels management funding, and the bureaus continued to spend this funding as they had in the past without taking the additional funding constraints for IIJA fuels management into account. As a result, in some instances, the bureaus expended IIJA funds and prioritized fuels management projects based on bureau objectives and priorities that did not always align with the IIJA's prioritization requirements. In addition, the bureaus did not monitor the funding

distribution and performance of IIJA-funded fuels management projects, and we found that the bureaus expended IIJA funds without proper approval. Bureaus moreover did not ensure that there was adequate support for all IIJA expenditures or that they met applicable requirements. Therefore, we questioned \$1,772,330 (15 percent of the tested costs) as unallowable and unsupported costs. In a separate, but related matter, we found that bureaus did not update fire management plans associated with fuels treatment projects and expenditures. These problems occurred, in part, because OWF did not provide oversight or provide guidance to the bureaus' fuels management programs, although oversight is a primary function of that office.

We made 34 recommendations that, if implemented, will help DOI and its bureaus ensure that they are prioritizing and spending IIJA fuels management funds to achieve the objectives set forth in the IIJA. We consider five of these recommendations significant. We closed 10 recommendations that we determined were implemented by DOI before we issued our final report.





Cut and piled junipers in treated areas approximately 6 miles from Summer Lake, Oregon, as part of the BLM North Warner Thinning Project (left) and approximately 24 miles northeast of Plush, Oregon, as part of the FWS Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge Thinning Project (right). Source: OIG.

The Bureau of Indian Education Must Correct Safety and Health Deficiencies and Improve Emergency Preparedness, Security, and Facility Management System Accuracy at Riverside Indian School (2024-ISP-040)



Our objectives were to determine whether (1) BIE addressed deficiencies found during required

annual safety and health inspections, (2) Riverside Indian School developed a security plan and emergency management program, and (3) BIE completed and documented background checks for school staff in accordance with regulations, policies, and guidelines.

We found that BIE did not always ensure safety and health deficiencies were addressed or resolved in a timely manner. Some of these deficiencies qualified as catastrophic, defined by DOI guidance as a deficiency that presents an imminent and immediate danger of death or permanent disability; others were critical, defined as a deficiency that risks permanent partial disablement or temporary total disability; and some qualified as significant, which is a deficiency that can result in a hospitalized minor injury or reversible illness. Specifically, a catastrophic deficiency identified in January 2024 related to an inoperative fire detection alarm system had not been corrected as of February 2025, and no mitigating measure had been put into place. We also found that critical and significant deficiencies at the school—including repeat deficiencies—remained unaddressed. We found that 57 percent (25 of 44) of the FY 2024 deficiencies we reviewed remained unresolved and in need of correction, even though the BIE established abatement timelines in the facility management system had passed.

For those deficiencies that had been corrected, none were completed within the established abatement periods. We also identified data reliability issues in BIE's facility management system. We sampled 56 from a total of 417 critical and significant deficiencies BIE reported as corrected and closed. We found that 27 of 56, or 48 percent, had not been corrected, and the associated work





Blocked exit (left) and broken emergency lighting (right): two unaddressed critical deficiencies were for failure to have a required emergency plan with exit routes for two separate buildings. Both of these deficiencies were open beyond the 30-day abatement period. Emergency plans with exit routes provide procedures for safe emergency evacuations. Source: OIG.

orders were incorrectly closed—meaning that the associated deficiencies still existed. Many of these closed work order errors were related to safety and fire maintenance issues. In addition, although the school did have the basic components of the emergency management program, it only partially met and, in some instances, failed to meet, all the specified requirements of the program and did not have a security plan.

Failure to correct deficiencies found during the annual safety and health inspections exposes students and staff to a potentially unsafe and unhealthy school and work environment. By addressing the deficiencies, the school may be better positioned to ensure a quality educational environment for the children. Without a comprehensive emergency management program, staff and students may be left unprepared if an emergency occurs, which could cause serious harm to staff or students, disrupt school operations, or cause physical or environmental damage to the school. Inaccurate reporting of work orders may create inefficiencies in funding, result in inadequate monitoring, and create an inaccurate perception of a safe environment when risks persist.

We did not identify concerns related to BIE's suitability for employment determinations. We confirmed that BIE completed required suitability for employment determinations to ensure school

employees met the minimum standards of character based on background checks.

We made 10 recommendations that, if implemented, will improve the school's overall facility condition by reducing the number of safety and health deficiencies, increasing staff's ability to respond to maintenance requirements, and improving the school's security and emergency preparedness. We consider one of these recommendations significant.

The U.S. Department of the Interior Information Systems at Increased Risk Due to Unmitigated Known Vulnerabilities (2023-ITA-007)



We conducted this inspection to determine whether DOI is reducing cybersecurity risks by remediating software

vulnerabilities in accordance with Federal and DOI policies. We found that, notwithstanding DOI and other Federal policies, DOI is not consistently reducing cybersecurity risks by remediating software vulnerabilities1 that have been rated as the most severe.2 Specifically, we found 9,384 vulnerabilities on DOI systems identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as "known exploited vulnerabilities" (KEVs) that had not been remediated within the mandated timeframe. KEVs are the highest priority for remediation, as they have been identified by CISA as being actively exploited by malicious cyber actors. We also found a total of 153,665 critical and high impact vulnerabilities on DOI systems that were not remediated within required timeframes. DOI's high number of unresolved critical and high impact vulnerabilities also significantly increased DOI's risk of compromise. We immediately notified DOI and the affected bureaus and offices of these findings so they could validate and remediate these issues.



Source: Adobe Stock

These deficiencies occurred because the DOI Office of the Chief Information Officer did not provide sufficient vulnerability remediation guidance and oversight to bureaus and offices. We found this lack of guidance caused the vulnerability management standard operating procedures to vary between bureaus and offices, resulting in inconsistent remediation of vulnerabilities across DOI. This issue was exacerbated because, while the historical data required for calculating the age of a vulnerability existed within DOI, it was not readily available on the dashboard, and not all bureaus knew how to access that data outside the dashboard. Without this data, DOI could not determine how long a vulnerability went unremediated on its network.

Vulnerabilities in Federal computer systems are frequent attack vectors³ for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risk to critical Federal systems and data. If exploited, these vulnerabilities could have serious or severe adverse effects on DOI operations, including, but not limited to, system takeover by malicious third parties, ransomware, or exposure of sensitive data. DOI relies on complex,

¹ The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines vulnerability as "[w]eakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source." https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/vulnerability.

² Vulnerabilities are ranked according to their potential harm to systems, with risk ratings of critical, high, medium, or low. These vulnerability ratings allow organizations to prioritize remediation by addressing the highest rated vulnerabilities first. CISA further designates vulnerabilities it identifies as currently being exploited as KEVs and requires the vulnerabilities to be the most aggressively remediated, regardless of their initial vulnerability rating.

³ According to NIST Special Publication 800-53 RA-5(10), an attack vector is a path or means by which an adversary can gain access to a system to deliver malicious code or exfiltrate information.

interconnected information systems to carry out its daily operations and maintain an accurate view of the security posture of every bureau and office. Without sufficient oversight of information systems, DOI will remain unaware of potential threats posed by vulnerabilities that could permeate the networks connecting bureaus and offices.

To reduce risk, DOI must remediate vulnerabilities in a timely manner to reduce the window of opportunity for attackers. If DOI is not aware of, or does not accurately report its security posture, DOI's risk-based decision making could be impeded and result in increased risk of compromise to its information systems, loss of sensitive data, and disruption of mission operations.

We made nine recommendations to help DOI strengthen its IT governance practices pertaining to vulnerability management and reduce the risk that unmitigated vulnerabilities pose to DOI IT assets. We consider two of these recommendations significant.

Reports Issued

Flash Report: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Inflation Reduction Act Endangered Species Recovery Efforts (2024-ISP-012)



Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Grants Awarded to the State of Oregon by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2024-CGD-028)



OSMRE and Pennsylvania Have Opportunities To Improve as They Prepare To Spend \$3.7 Billion in Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funding (2024-ISP-020)









An abandoned mine discharges highly acidic, iron-laden water into the Loyalhanna watershed at about 4,500 gallons per minute. This prevents plant and animal life from inhabiting the stream. Source: OIG.

U.S. Department of the Interior's Compliance With the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 in Its Fiscal Year 2024 Agency Financial Report (2025-FIN-017)





Weaknesses in U.S. Department of the Interior's Oversight of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation's Hurricane Sandy Coastal Resilience Competitive Grants Program (2023-CGD-028)



Flash Report: Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Development and Operations in the U.S. Department of the Interior (2024-CTD-029)



Risks Identified for Inflation Reduction Act Funds Awarded by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation for Drought Mitigation Projects (2023-WR-035-A)



Summary: Quality Control Review American Samoa's Single Audit for FY 2023 (2025-FIN-018)





Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Grants Awarded to the State of Minnesota by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2024-CGD-027)





Summary: Evaluation of the U.S. Department of the Interior's Cyber Threat Hunting Program (2023-CTD-039)



Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Grants Awarded to the State of Nevada by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2025-CGD-004)



The Office of Insular Affairs Needs To Ensure Insular Areas' Compliance With Federal Regulations Related to Single Audit Submissions (2025-FIN-005)





Weaknesses in BLM's Management of Solar and Wind Rights of Way Applications Creates Risks for Federal Lands (2023-ER-017)



The U.S. Department of the Interior Needs To Improve Consistency in Implementation of Federal Standards for Accounting and Reporting of Government Land (2023-FIN-038)



The U.S. Department of the Interior Did Not Always Appropriately Classify and Approve Information Technology Purchases (2024-ISP-031)



Hurricane Sandy Oversight (2025-ISP-033)



The Orphaned Wells Program Office and the State of Kansas Have Opportunities To Improve Spending of Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Orphaned Wells Funding (2024-ISP-018)









Statistical Highlights | April 1, 2025–September 30, 2025

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

Complaints

	•	
196		660
Referred to DOI		Received
ı	nvestigations	
	45	31

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ACTIVITIES

Closed

4 3 8

3: 13 years^{*} 2: 302 months
Probation Jail Time

Opened

 5: \$350,507.71
 2: \$5,100.00†
 5: \$600.00

 Criminal Restitutions
 Criminal Fines
 Assessments

Criminal Matters

Referred for Prosecution		Declinations
	15	7

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

Referrals

Declinations

2: \$300,000.00
Civil Settlements

Civil Recoveries

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES

12 Personnel Actions

2 Removals 3 Reprimands 1 Retirement 1 Suspension 3 Other 2 Unfounded

26 Administrative Remedy Activities

10 Referrals0 Suspensions13 Debarments0 Administrative Agreements3 No Action Taken

2 Financial Recoveries

1: \$16,726,326.54
Additional or Unpaid Royalties Recovered
1: \$39,698.80

Bill for Collection Issued

General Policy Actions

PAST DUE RESPONSE

Bureau of Indian Education

^{*}These formulas represent the number of judgments and the resulting penalties. For example, 3 judgments resulted in a total of 13 years of probation.

^{†\$5,000} in criminal fines occurred in the last SAR period but were not reported to this office until after the last SAR was published, so it is being included in the statistics for this reporting period.

Featured Reports

Summary: BIE Employee Sexually Harassed Students on the Haskell Indian Nations University Women's Basketball Team (24-0513)





We investigated allegations that a BIE employee sexually harassed student-athletes on the Haskell

Indian Nations University (Haskell) Women's Basketball Team.

We found that the employee made crude jokes and comments of a sexual nature to students and engaged in unwelcome physical contact with at least one student; we also found that the employee's behavior deterred some student-athletes from going to the athletic training room to receive treatment. We concluded that the employee's behavior violated DOI Personnel Bulletin 18-01, "Prevention and Elimination of Harassing Conduct" (PB 18-01) and the Haskell "Sexual Violence and Abuse, Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment" Standard Operating Procedures (Haskell SOP Handbook). Moreover, the conduct in question implicated State of Kansas regulations applicable to athletic trainers. Additionally, we found that the employee's supervisor and other staff were aware of the harassing conduct but failed to report the behavior as required under PB 18-01 and the Haskell SOP Handbook.

Bureau of Indian Education-Operated Postsecondary Institutions' Policies, Processes, and Training Related to Sexual Misconduct Complaints (24-0001)





We initiated this review to determine whether two postsecondary institutions operated by BIE,

Haskell Indian Nations University (Haskell) and Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI), followed laws and policies related to student complaints of sexual harassment and other sexual misconduct (hereinafter "sexual misconduct").

We focused our review on three specific issues:

1. Whether Haskell's and SIPI's policies for responding to student complaints of sexual



Source: Adobe Stock

misconduct complied with applicable law and DOI policy.

- 2. Whether Haskell and SIPI responded to student complaints of sexual misconduct in accordance with their own written policies and procedures.
- Whether Haskell and SIPI provided training to their employees with respect to student complaints of sexual misconduct as required by DOI and school policies.

We concluded that Haskell's and SIPI's written policies for responding to student complaints of sexual misconduct complied with the relevant Executive Order and DOI policy. Specifically, both institutions' policies prohibited discrimination based on sex and established procedures for the receipt, review, and disposition of student sexual

misconduct complaints in a timely manner. We were unable to determine, however, whether Haskell and SIPI responded to student complaints of sexual misconduct in accordance with their policies and procedures because neither institution maintained required documentation in their case files. Without this documentation, we were unable to determine how Haskell and SIPI reviewed, investigated, and adjudicated complaints of sexual misconduct. Finally, we found that neither Haskell nor SIPI ensured that their employees received training on sexual misconduct as required by applicable policy.

We referred our findings to the BIE Director for any action deemed appropriate.

Collin County Man Sentenced to Over 24 years in Federal Prison for COVID-fraud Conspiracy (DOJ Press Release)



We initiated an investigation into a BLM petroleum engineer, Olabode Ajibola, who had over \$222,000 in

SBA Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans.

We identified other subjects in the case and uncovered an elaborate PPP loan fraud conspiracy that defrauded SBA's PPP program out of millions of dollars. We pursued a joint investigation with SBA OIG and the FBI, which ultimately resulted in the arrest of numerous individuals. The case was presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Texas, resulting in the indictment of 11 individuals for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Eight of these individuals pleaded guilty to felonies, and three went to trial. A jury found the three individuals who went to trial, including Ajibola, guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering, with a loss to the Government of \$2.7 million.

This DOJ press release provides information concerning the sentencing of the ringleader of the conspiracy, Olamide Bello, who was sentenced on July 24 to over 24 years in prison for his role in the conspiracy.

The BLM employee was sentenced on August 26, 2025, to 60 months' probation and restitution in the amount of \$222,664.



Source: Adobe Stock

Summary: Former Non-Profit Research Archeologist Embezzled BOR Cooperative Funds for Personal Use (24-0087)

We investigated allegations that a former Research Archeologist at the Institute of the Great Plains (IGP) in Lawton, Oklahoma, embezzled funds the IGP received through BOR cooperative agreements. We substantiated the allegations.

From 2003 to March 2020, Debra Baker worked at IGP; she cataloged artifacts and served as the project manager for several BOR cooperative agreements. On August 21, 2018, BOR awarded IGP a five-year, \$244,000 cooperative agreement to support artifact curation, archival supplies, shelving, computer equipment, two interns, and professional archaeological services in Oklahoma.

Baker was an authorized signatory on IGP's checking account and had access to a debit card. She admitted to using the IGP debit card to make unauthorized personal purchases, including groceries, pet supplies, travel, and cash withdrawals. We found evidence confirming this admission. Between July 2019 and February 2020, Baker made personal purchases on the IGP debit card totaling at least \$35,535.97.

On January 7, 2025, Baker pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), Theft Concerning a Program Receiving Federal Funds. On May 21, 2025, she

was sentenced to five years of probation and ordered to pay \$35,535.97 in restitution.

This is a summary of an investigative report we issued to the Acting Commissioner of BOR.

Reports Issued

Summary: FWS Supervisor Allowed Employee to Receive Incorrect Locality Pay and Travel Reimbursement (24-0009)



Failure to Decommission Offshore Platforms (24-0057)





Summary: FWS Employee Did Not Violate Duty of Candor But FWS Overpaid Relocation Benefits (24-0021)



Summary: Former Supervisory Procurement Analyst Violated Ethics Regulations, DOI Policy, and Federal Law (24-0463)



Source: Adobe Stock



Summary of Recommendation Activity

We are tracking a total of 406 open recommendations, including 89 that are significant and 36 that are unresolved. These open recommendations are related to questioned costs of \$38,327,078, and we identified \$5,220,072 in funds to be put to better use.

In this reporting period, we issued 91 recommendations in 20 audit, inspection, and evaluation reports. Of those recommendations, 20 were determined to be significant, and 15 are unresolved. We identified \$2,071,605 in questioned costs.


We closed 141 recommendations this period, of which 14 recommendations were from reports issued in this reporting period and 127 recommendations were from reports issued in prior reporting periods (older than six months). In those closed recommendations, \$1,150,011 in costs were disallowed and recovered by DOI and 20 significant recommendations were closed. Seven recommendations were closed without implementation because of new or revised Federal guidance that made the recommendations no longer applicable.

Fifteen recommendations that were previously unresolved have since been resolved through discussions with DOI and revisions to corrective action plans. We continue to coordinate with the DOI and its bureaus to address 36 unresolved recommendations.

SUMMARY

	406 Number of Recommendations \$5,220,072 Funds for Better Use		\$11,300,810 Questioned Costs Unallowable	\$27,026,268 Questioned Co Unsupported	osts
	Significant & Unresolved Reco	mmendations	Significant	Unresolved	Both
ı			79	26	10


Age of Recommendations (in Months)



Number of Unresolved Recommendations by Bureau



Number of Open Recommendations by Bureau



^{*} The Wildlife and Sportfish Restoration program (WSFR) is one of the largest grant programs managed by DOI. It provides funding for States and Territories to support projects that promote the conservation and restoration of wild birds and mammals and their habitats and programs that provide hunter education and safety training and opportunities. The OIG has an agreement with FWS to conduct audits for all States and Territories receiving funds through the program on a five-year cycle. FWS coordinates implementation with the States and Territories, reviews and endorses the closure packages, and forwards them to the OIG for final approval.

Bureau and Office Abbreviations

AS-IA	Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs	NPS	National Park Service
AS-WS	Assistant Secretary for Water and Science	OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs	OIA	Office of Insular Affairs
BIE	Bureau of Indian Education	OLES	Office of Law Enforcement and Security
BLM	Bureau of Land Management	OS	Office of the Secretary
BOEM	Bureau of Ocean Energy Management	OSMRE	Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
BOR	Bureau of Reclamation		and Enforcement
BSEE	Bureau of Safety and Environmental	OWF	Office of Wildland Fire
	Enforcement	OWPO	Orphaned Wells Program Office
BTFA	Bureau of Trust Funds Administration	PFM	Office of Financial Management
DAS-M	Deputy Assistant Secretary for	PMB	Office of Policy, Management and Budget
	Management [AS-IA]	WSFR	Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Program
FWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service		



Open Recommendations

This appendix is provided as a regularly updated online resource on the OIG website. The OIG's online Recommendations Tracker includes data related to reports with open recommendations and also identifies all significant and unresolved recommendations that have not been implemented. This webpage provides a searchable list of AIE open recommendations. (Because it identifies open recommendations only, the resource may not include the full listing of recommendations made in each report.)

https://www.doioig.gov/recommendations

Monetary Resolution Activities

For the Period Ending September 30, 2025

TABLE 1: INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS WITH QUESTIONED COSTS*

		Number of Reports	Unallowable Costs	Unsupported Costs	Total Questioned Costs
Α.	For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period. (As of March 31, 2025)	22	\$16,227,267	\$27,438,365	\$43,665,632
В.	Which were issued during the reporting period.	2	\$1,922,503	\$149,102	\$2,071,605
	Subtotal (A+B)	24	\$18,149,770	\$27,587,467	\$45,737,237
C.	For which a management decision was made during the reporting period. ((i)+(ii))	6	\$2,844,781	\$182,197	\$3,026,978
	(i) Dollar value of costs disallowed.	-	\$1,139,013	\$10,998	\$1,150,011
	(ii) Dollar value of costs allowed.	-	\$1,705,768	\$171,199	\$1,876,967
D.	For which no management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period. (Subtotal – C)	17 †	\$11,300,810	\$27,026,268	\$38,327,078

^{*} Does not include non-Federal funds.

[†] Three projects contained both open and closed questioned cost recommendations.

Monetary Resolution Activities

For the Period Ending September 30, 2025

TABLE 2: INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS THAT FUNDS BE PUT TO BETTER USE

		Number of Reports	Dollar Value
Α.	For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period. (As of March 31, 2025)	3	\$5,662,704
В.	Which were issued during the reporting period.	0	-
	Subtotal (A+B)	3	\$5,662,704
C.	For which a management decision was made during the reporting. ((i)+(ii))	1	\$442,632
	(i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management.	0	_
	(ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management.	1	\$442,632
D.	For which no management decision had been made by the end of the reporting period. (Subtotal – C)	2	\$5,220,072



Federal Financial Management Improvement Act

KPMG's independent auditor's report on DOI's financial statements for FYs 2024 and 2023 disclosed no instances in which DOI's financial management systems did not substantially comply with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act. KPMG conducted no related work during this reporting period.



Administrative False Claims Act

During this reporting period, OIG investigating officials submitted no investigative reports involving potential Administrative False Claims Act claims to reviewing officials. Thus, there were no instances in which a reviewing official declined to proceed on a reported case.

Peer Reviews of OIG Operations

Government audit, inspection and evaluation, and investigative standards require each statutory OIG to receive an independent, comprehensive peer review of its audit and investigative operations once every three years, consistent with applicable standards and guidelines.

In general, these peer reviews determine whether the OIG's internal quality control system is adequate as designed and provides reasonable assurance that the OIG follows applicable standards, policies, and procedures. The Inspector General Act of 1978 requires OIGs to provide in their semiannual reports to Congress information about peer reviews of their respective organizations and their peer reviews of other OIGs.

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

We conducted no peer reviews of other OIGs during this reporting period.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General (EPA OIG) completed a peer review on DOI OIG's inspection and evaluation organization's compliance with its system of quality control that was in effect for the period ending March 31, 2025. EPA OIG issued its final report on September 22, 2025, and issued a rating of "pass." There are no open recommendations.

The most recent audit peer review of our office was performed by Treasury OIG and covered our system of quality control in effect for the year ended September 30, 2022. Treasury issued its final report and letter of comment on June 27, 2023. We received a rating of "pass," and there are no open recommendations.

Investigations

We conducted no peer reviews, and no peer reviews were completed of us during this reporting period. The Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG conducted the most recent investigative peer review of DOI OIG covering the period of February 2022 to February 2025. The Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG issued its final report on March 20, 2025, and found DOI OIG in compliance with relevant standards and applicable Attorney General Guidelines.



Instances of Agency Interference

During this reporting period, the establishment has not attempted to interfere with the independence of OIG through budget constraints specifically designed to limit the capabilities of OIG. The establishment has not attempted to interfere with the independence of OIG through incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of OIG or restricted or significantly delayed access to information.



Investigations Involving Senior Government Officials

Investigations Involving Senior Government Officials Where Misconduct Was Substantiated

We substantiated allegations that Keith A. Toomey, Deputy Assistant Director for FWS OLE, allowed an OLE Agent to receive incorrect locality pay and reimbursement for travel between the OLE Agent's residence and official worksite in violation of applicable regulations and DOI and FWS policies. We issued a report of investigation to FWS and published a summary of the report on our website during this reporting period.

We also substantiated allegations that Tiffany Harvey, former Supervisory Procurement Analyst (GS-15), Office of Acquisition and Property Management, Immediate Office of the Secretary, DOI, used Government property for unauthorized purposes in violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of Ethical Conduct) and DOI policy, used official time to conduct commercial gain activities in violation of the Standards of Ethical Conduct, and failed to disclose outside employment as required. We also substantiated that the Supervisory Procurement Analyst received additional pay in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 5536 by improperly certifying her work status with DOI. We issued a report of investigation to DOI and published a summary on our website during this reporting period.

Investigations Involving a Senior Government Official That Were Closed but Not Disclosed to the Public

We did not investigate or substantiate any allegations of misconduct by a senior official that were closed but not disclosed to the public.

Alleged Whistleblower Retaliation

The OIG did not substantiate any allegations of whistleblower retaliation this reporting period.

OIG CONTACT INFORMATION



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